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Demystifying Schmitt
Eric A. Posner * & Adrian Vermeule **

Carl Schmitt is too important to be left to the Schmitt specialists. To their credit, the
Schmitt specialists were the first to recognize this. In recent years many of Schmitt’s most
important works have been given authoritative new translations, 1 while intellectual historians
and political theorists specializing (at least in part) in Schmitt and his contemporaries have
labored to set Schmitt’s work in intellectual and historical context, explaining its content and
significance for academics in other disciplines. 2
The goal of open-access to Schmitt’s thinking, however, requires more than translation
and historical context. Even when those indispensable first steps have been accomplished, there
remains a barrier to entry for those who would draw upon Schmitt’s work to illuminate subjects
such as the design and operation of constitutions, emergency powers, and the administrative
state. The barrier is that Schmitt’s work grows out of and exemplifies a continental tradition of
legal and political theory that is heavily conceptual and laden with jurisprudential jargon.
Especially for American lawyers whose interdisciplinary toolkit is drawn from the social
sciences that flowered after World War II, Schmitt’s thought seems relentlessly abstract and
mystifying.
In this chapter, we attempt to demystify some of Schmitt’s core insights by interpreting
them in light of simple causal intuitions and models drawn from the social sciences, including
economics, law-and-economics, and political science. The aim is not exegetical or historical; of
course we do not suggest that Schmitt thought in such terms, or that the social-scientific
interpretations we offer are the best contextual understanding of Schmitt’s ideas from the internal
point of view. Rather, the aim is utilitarian. It is to make some of Schmitt’s ideas usable for
research in other disciplines, and to illustrate a general approach to Schmitt that can be applied to
all of his writings.
*
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In Section 1, we focus on Schmitt’s distinction between legality and legitimacy, and the
associated idea that legitimacy often amounts to a strictly negative power on the part of mass
publics to resist elite proposals, either through negative votes in referenda or through extralegal
resistance. Although liberal theorists worried by the specter of a plebiscitary executive have cast
these ideas in ominous terms, as a form of proto-fascist democracy-by-acclamation or “soccerstadium democracy,” 3 we interpret the ideas in terms of recent work on the political foundations
of constitutionalism. Schmitt’s distinction between legality and legitimacy, we suggest, rests on
the unimpeachable insight that constitutional rules amount to nothing more than “parchment
barriers” unless supported by the equilibrium political strategies of officials, citizens, political
parties and other actors. In this setting, Schmitt’s emphasis on the latent threat of mass violence
amounts to nothing more than an attempt to dig down to the ultimate microfoundations of
constitutionalism.
In Section 2, we focus on Schmitt’s distinction between the norm and the exception. This
distinction is related to legality and legitimacy, because Schmitt claimed that legality and
legitimacy are convergent in normal times and divergent in exceptional situations. Yet the
distinction between norm and exception raises separate issues as well, because Schmitt famously
claimed that the exception necessarily has the potential to intrude upon the “closed system” 4 of
constitutional legality in liberal regimes. We interpret this point in terms of the economic
distinction between rules and standards, and in terms of the lawyerly idea of purposive
interpretation. Schmitt’s idea of “commissarial dictatorship” as a form of dictatorship that may
violate certain constitutional rules in order to protect and conserve the overall structure of the
constitutional order is a form of standard-based purposivism writ large.
Interpreting Schmitt in our terms might just amount to a different form of translation, not
from German to English but from jurisprudential to social-scientific terms. Yet we think there is
more to it than that. Casting Schmitt’s insights in the more concrete and pragmatic terms of the
social sciences might make it possible also to cast them, or some of them, in the form of testable
hypotheses, letting the fresh air of fact into the occasionally feverish world of Schmitt
scholarship. The ultimate aim would be to test whether and to what extent Schmitt’s work
generalizes beyond Weimar, to other times and constitutional or political systems. This is an aim
that will to some degree de-contextualize his work, yet it is the logical conclusion of the Schmitt
specialists’ work in broadening access to his ideas.
1. Legality and Legitimacy: Political Foundations of Constitutionalism
Schmitt’s last major work before the collapse of Weimar was Legality and Legitimacy,
published in 1932. The work is in some respects inevitably time-bound and place-bound; in part,
Schmitt was participating in the politically fraught legal polemics of the day, particularly
3
4
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involving President Hindenburg’s use of the emergency powers granted by Article 48 of the
Weimar constitution. In this sense, Legality and Legitimacy is the hardest possible test case for
our aim of interpreting Schmitt in generalizable social-scientific terms. Perhaps the work is so
pervasively a creature of its background circumstances that it is hopeless to try to salvage any of
its ideas from the wreck of Weimar, in many respects an outlier case for constitutional
democracies. Yet we think that Legality and Legitimacy pioneers several major insights that
political scientists and lawyers interested in constitutionalism have recently begun to appreciate
and explore, in most cases seemingly without any awareness of Schmitt. Although the richness
of Legality and Legitimacy means that one is somewhat spoiled for choice, we will focus on the
connections among legality, legitimacy and the issue of the political foundations of
constitutionalism.
Schmitt begins Legality and Legitimacy with a new typology of regimes, intended to
supersede Aristotle’s threefold classification of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy (each of
which has both healthy and degenerate forms – the degenerate forms being respectively tyranny,
oligarchy and mob rule). In Schmitt’s taxonomy, there are legislative states in which the central
locus of lawmaking is a representative parliament, jurisdiction states in which the courts develop
freestanding legal norms, and governmental-administrative states in which the executive or the
bureaucracy issues situation-specific decrees. One of the book’s main theses is that the
legislative state equates legitimacy with legality, which Schmitt argues is an impoverished
account of legitimacy.
The problems with this equation are twofold. First, the general norms or rules of law
enacted by representative legislatures through statutes typically assume a normal, stable state of
affairs in which it is possible to imagine a “closed system of legality”5 covering the whole space
of possible policies. In such an environment, legality and legitimacy are largely congruent.
Where the political and economic environment changes rapidly, however, exceptions to general
statutes become necessary and legality and legitimacy may diverge. This is the problem of the
exception, which we take up in Section 2 below.
A related but distinct problem, however, is logically antecedent to the distinction between
the norm and the exception. In the legislative or parliamentary state, there is no role for direct
political action by the masses, as opposed to the peaceful procedures of representative
democracy; as Schmitt puts it, “[a] closed system of legality grounds the claim to obedience and
justifies the suspension of every right of resistance.” 6 But it is unclear, Schmitt points out, how
legality by itself could causally motivate compliance with law (whether or not as a normative
matter it justifies compliance with law). The legislative state “assumes away the issue of

5
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‘obedience’ …. Schmitt avers that contemporary legality does not account for why authority is
obeyed.” 7
Schmitt here is offering a critique, quite explicitly, of Max Weber’s famous classification
of the grounds of legitimacy. Weber distinguished three sources of legitimacy: traditional,
charismatic, and rational-legal. Schmitt in effect argues that the third cannot be sufficient by
itself to support the legislative state, and that in fact “legality is in direct opposition to
legitimacy.” 8 More precisely, legality is neither necessary nor sufficient for legitimacy. As
Schmitt put it:
Linguistic usage today has already proceeded so far that it perceives the legal as
something ‘merely formal’ and in opposition to the legitimate. Without a sense of
contradiction, for example, one can today consider a dissolution of the Reichstag ‘strictly
legal,’ even though it is, in fact, a coup d’état, and, vice versa, a parliamentary dissolution
might substantively conform to the spirit of the constitution, and yet not be legal.
Schmitt’s examples here are provocative, perhaps deliberately so, and instill in liberal
legalists a sense of foreboding; they tend to read Schmitt as implicitly referring to the street
violence of the early 1930s, and perhaps even foreshadowing the events of 1933. Yet there is a
less lurid interpretation. On this interpretation, Schmitt is pointing to the problem of parchment
barriers. As Madison noted, in the face of widespread public sentiment, legal rules in written or
convention-based constitutions may be swept away. 9
Constitutions face a pervasive
commitment problem: for self-sufficient national states, there is no enforcer external to society
who can police attempts to deviate from the constitutional rules. 10 Rational, self-interested
citizens and political agents have no clear incentive to obey and enforce the law. The “closed
system of legality” in the legislative state cannot, by itself, secure the political conditions for its
own enforcement; obedience to or compliance with the law needs microfoundations in the
incentives and beliefs of political actors, including voters, officials, political parties, interest
7
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8
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groups, and social movements. In the terms of legal theory, Schmitt anticipates the point that
compliance with the large-c Constitution is shaped and constrained by small-c constitutionalism.
A literature in political science recognizes this problem – what are the political
foundations of constitutionalism? -- and attempts to identify conditions under which
constitutions generally, or particular constitutional structures such as elections, can become
incentive-compatible or self-enforcing for rational, self-interested agents. 11 In one pioneering
model, an incumbent government faces two or more political actors – perhaps classes, or ethnic
groups, or political parties. If either cooperates with the incumbent, then those two may join
forces to prey upon the other political actor. The actors must then coordinate in order to block
predation by the incumbent, which if it occurs would benefit the incumbent but reduce overall
welfare. If the two actors have Assurance Game preferences, such that cooperation is the first
choice for both, then the two may resist the incumbent so long as there is a focal point that
allows them to coordinate their resistance. Even if the two actors have Prisoners’ Dilemma
preferences, such that defection (i.e. cooperation with the incumbent) would be the dominant
strategy for each in a single-shot game, cooperation to resist the incumbent is an equilibrium12 so
long as the long-run benefits of doing so are sufficiently high, neither actor discounts the future
too heavily, and what counts as a cooperative move is sufficiently clear. The last proviso means
that focal points have a role even in the indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game, insofar
as the would-be cooperators need to possess common knowledge about what cooperation entails.
This model focuses on agency problems; the actors’ problem is to prevent welfarereducing exploitation by the incumbent. A different but compatible class of models puts
microfoundations under constitutionalism by asking under what conditions parties, classes of
other groups will or will not have incentives to rebel against the constitutional order, or instead
play within the rules of the political game. These models particularly resonate with the concerns
that animated legal and political theorists situated within Weimar, whose constitution teetered
precariously above a whirlpool of competing political movements, some of which aimed to
subvert the constitution altogether.
The basic idea of these models is to endogenize elections, rather than taking them for
granted. In one model, 13 elections grant the winning party control of the state, which is assumed
11

Barry R. Weingast, “Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” American Political Science
Review 91[1997]: 245-263; Barry R. Weingast, “Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With An Application to Democratic
Stability in America’s First Century,” Working Paper, Hoover Institution, September 2007; James D. Fearon, “SelfEnforcing Democracy,” Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science
Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 31-September 3; Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) at 35-38. For legal applications, see Daryl Levinson, “Parchment
and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment,” Harvard Law Review (forthcoming).
12
By virtue of the folk theorem, noncooperation is also an equilibrium.
13
For various versions, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 1; Adam Przeworski,
“Democracy as an Equilibrium,” Public Choice 123[2005]: 253-273.
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to be an indivisible good. The losing factions then face the choice whether to fight, or else to
wait for the next election cycle and take the chance of winning power for themselves. If the
long-run net benefit of participating in the electoral system is greater than the net expected
benefit of fighting now, rather than waiting for a turn in office, then each party will have selfinterested incentives to play within the rules. In this account, elections are essentially a
randomizing device that gives each party an equal (or at least sufficient) expectation of taking
power in the future. Just as one might divide a toy between two children through “taking turns,”
in order to prevent them from fighting over it, so too the indivisible good of state power is
allocated intertemporally, in expectation, through elections.
A critique of this model is that elections are inefficiently expensive if they serve as little
more than randomizing devices. An alternative model thus explains elections as focal points for
coordinating resistance to leaders. 14 Whether the leaders do or do not comply with the results of
elections is an easily observable public signal that provides the crucial element of common
knowledge; all concerned know that others know what has occurred, and so on. Leaders are
disciplined by the “rebellion constraint” 15 and elections have no very elevated political function,
but do help to make democracy in a minimalist sense 16 a political equilibrium.
Finally, the relationship between mass political action and democracy is explored from
another angle in a model of the expansion of the franchise in democratic polities. 17 In this
model, the threat of mass rebellion induces wealthy elites to grant a broadly democratic
franchise. Given reasonable assumptions about the distribution of wealth, a broad franchise
ensures that the median voter will favor redistributive measures, so democratization in effect
allows elites to commit to future redistribution. This model assumes that a commitment to an
expanded franchise is credible whereas a simple elite promise to enact redistributive policies
would not be, yet this is hardly obvious; if mass rebellion is costly, so that elites can simply
renege on their promises to enact first-order redistributive measures, then perhaps elites can also
renege on the grant of an expanded franchise. 18 Yet violations of the franchise and of the results
of elections may be more visible, and thus less costly for mass publics to monitor, than elite
incumbents’ undermining of redistributive policies. Here too, the relative clarity of electoral
rules makes their violation a useful focal point for coordinating mass uprising against
exploitative incumbents.

14

Fearon, “Self-Enforcing Democracy,” supra note 11.
Adam Przeworski, “Political Parties and Results of Elections,” in Democracy and the Rule of Law, Adam
Przeworski & José María Maravall eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 135.
16
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Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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Cambridge University Press, 2006).
18
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In Schmittian terms, models of the political foundations of constitutionalism both offer an
account of legitimacy and also connect legitimacy to constitutional legality. All the models
interpret legitimacy as a game-theoretic equilibrium: a constitution is legitimate when it has
microfoundations in the preferences, beliefs and choices of relevant actors, none of whom can do
better by unilateral attempts to subvert the constitutional order. Legality by itself is insufficient
to create legitimacy in this sense; writing a constitution on a piece of paper, by itself, does
nothing to make the constitution incentive-compatible. Yet legality can play an indirect role in
securing legitimacy-as-equilibrium: a written constitution or clearly defined constitutional
conventions 19 may establish focal points that enable political actors to coordinate on action,
including mass resistance or rebellion. In a sense, then, these models help to answer the question
Schmitt posed to Weber, about what exactly legality has to do with legitimacy, and what exactly
grounds obedience to the legislative rule-of-law state.
Ironically, this answer may after all be compatible with Weber’s views. Although Weber
can be read to suggest that legality is itself a form of legitimacy, another reading is that, in
Schmitt’s paraphrase of Weber, “the most widely prominent form of legitimacy today is the
belief in legality” (emphasis added). 20 If the key point is public belief in legality, rather than
legality as judged by the expert analyst, then we are not so far either from later sociological
accounts of legitimacy in the jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart, 21 or from the equilibrium accounts of
the political foundations of constitutionalism that we have reviewed. In the latter accounts,
public belief in legality is crucial; what matters is whether governmental violation of a clear
constitutional rule, such as holding elections and respecting their results, becomes common
knowledge among the public. In this sense, we may see Legality and Legitimacy as situated
within a theoretical stream that runs from Weber all the way to the contemporary political
science of constitutionalism. Within this stream, Schmitt has the honor of reviving Madison’s
critical question about parchment barriers – about why constitutional rules, written or indeed
unwritten, have any causal efficacy in politics – and using the vivid context of Weimar, in which
the political foundations of constitutionalism were patently problematic, in order to put the
question in its sharpest possible form.
Finally, the models of the political foundations of constitutionalism allow a demystifying
and less ominous interpretation of Schmitt’s insistence that the public’s role under
constitutionalism is in effect restricted to negative measures – either rejection of proposals in a
referendum or, in extreme cases, resistance to the ruling power. 22 In the models we have
canvassed, political groups exert influence on incumbents and competitors for powers not
through persuasion or democratic deliberation, but through credible threats of resistance or
19

Conventions in the sense of “norms,” not “assemblies.”
Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, supra note 1, at 9. Although the exact quote does not appear in Weber, the
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21
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
22
Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, supra note 1, at 29-31, 87-90.
20
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armed conflict. In the lurid context of Weimar these ideas call up associations with torchlight
rallies and thuggish street violence – “soccer-stadium democracy” – but this is to overlook that a
credible threat of mass public resistance to exploitative action by incumbents can be necessary
for the health of constitutionalism and democratic institutions. As Schmitt put it, “the ancient
problem of ‘resistance against the tyrant’ remains, that is, resistance against injustice and misuse
of state power, and the functionalistic-formalistic hollowing out of the parliamentary legislative
state is not able to resolve it.” 23 Here too, Schmitt’s distinction between legality and legitimacy
opens up a way of thinking about constitutionalism that proves more fruitful, because more
politically realistic, than liberal insistence that legitimacy can straightforwardly be reduced to
legality.
2. Rules, Standards, and Executive Primacy
Schmitt famously declared that “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception.” 24 This
enigmatic statement, which underlies his critical view of parliamentary democracy, is related to
two themes of American jurisprudence: the distinction between rules and standards, and the
limits on executive power.
Let us begin with rules and standards. Schmitt did not use the modern law-andeconomics argot, but his argument that legislatures cannot enact into law general rules that
adequately guide and constrain executives during crises can be put into the modern idiom. 25 In
law and economics, a rule is a norm that is specified in advance of the conduct that it regulates.
A standard is a norm that is applied retroactively to conduct that has already occurred. For
example, a simple traffic rule—speed limit of 60 miles per hour—is determined in advance, and
then applied to drivers. The tort standard—drive with “due care”—does not specify in advance
the speed or other attribute of driving behavior that will be sanctioned. A police officer or court
will determine whether a driver has acted with due care on the spot, or afterward. The legislature
that enacts a standard puts off the determination of the norm by delegating that function to an
enforcement agent or court.
In order to enact a sensible rule, the decisionmaker must invest resources in predicting
the future and evaluating future behavior. This investment is the cost of using rules. One does
not incur this cost with standards because they are applied after the behavior has occurred. The
benefit of using rules is that they render predictable the legal consequences of one’s actions,
enabling people to plan and deterring them from socially harmful behavior. By contrast, because
standards are vague, decisionmakers will have difficult implementing them consistently and
23

Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, supra note 1, 29.
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25
Schmitt’s views on the limits of parliamentary democracy can be found in Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy (Ellen Kennedy trans., 1985), among other places. This aspect of his thought, and its
relationship to modern jurisprudential debates, is lucidly described in Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the
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individuals will have a hard time predicting the legal consequences of their actions. Thus, it is
better to use rules when the behavior in question recurs frequently and predictably 26 – when the
behavior is the “norm.” The investment in determining the optimal rule is spread over a large set
of actions. When a particular action does not recur frequently and predictably – when it is the
“exception” -- decisionmaking should be deferred until the action occurs, that is, a standard
should be used.
It should be clear that law by standards is nearly the same as retroactive determination of
law. The difference is that the standard is specified in advance, ruling out at least some behavior.
The due care standard, for example, rules out a subsequent determination that driving at 150
miles per hour is lawful. Standards can be more or less specific; the more specific, the more they
resemble a rule. Indeed, the choice between rules and standards is not binary; a perfectly
specified rule and an extremely vague standard lie at the end of a spectrum, and all legal norms
lie in between. Although we will continue to refer to rules and standards as ideal types, the
continuous nature of this variable should be kept in mind.
The U.S. Congress enacts both rules (the Tax Code) and standards (antitrust law). Even
highly complex rules, however, have pockets of vagueness—standards—that are left to courts to
work out over time. And vague statutes gradually resolve themselves into sets of rules as
judicial interpretations accumulate and form precedent. The same dynamic processes are
familiar from the common law. In the bloodless language of law and economics, rules and
standards reflect tradeoffs, and it is not surprising, indeed it is predictable, that certain areas of
the law are dominated by rules, while other areas of the law are dominated by standards.
From this perspective, the subversive reputation of Schmitt’s work on sovereignty might
seem hard to understand. To understand why Schmitt’s work is in fact radical, one should recall
that lawyers who discuss rules and standards almost always do so in the context of the common
law. When a legislature enacts a standard, it expects courts to interpret it in the course of
resolving disputes between litigants. Judges are expected to be impartial, and various rules
ensure that they usually are. Trial judges are monitored by appellate courts; and judicial
decisions, while important for the litigants, do not have larger, systemic effects unless other
judges in other courts find them persuasive. As judges decide cases, the vague standards
gradually take on content and resolve into rules of varying specificity. Legislatures can
intervene and overturn opinions that run counter to the original purposes of the statutes that are
being interpreted. In interpreting statutes, and in other forms of common law development,
judges in this way engage in retroactive lawmaking but of a type that is gradual and relatively
predictable, that is subject to legislative veto, and hence that does not offend the rule of law.

26
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Now consider the setting that interested Schmitt: the role of the executive. To understand
Schmitt’s argument, we need to introduce another concept from economics—agency costs. An
agency relationship consists of two people: a principal and an agent. 27 In the simplest models,
the agent takes some action that benefits or harms the principal, and then the principal rewards or
punishes the agent. For example, an employer (the principal) will reward a worker (the agent)
with a high wage if the agent produces a high level of output, and sanction the worker with a low
wage or some other penalty if the agent produces a low level of output.
In the standard agency model, the agent’s level of effort stochastically determines the
level of output. A high level of effort is more likely to produce a high level of output, but luck
may intervene, so that high effort leads to low output or low effort leads to high output. If the
principal can observe the level of effort, the optimal contract simply rewards the agent who uses
high effort and punishes the agent who uses low effort. But the model assumes that the principal
cannot directly observe effort and can only observe output. Thus, a contract that rewards high
output may inadvertently punish the high-effort worker who experiences bad luck. Nonetheless,
the principal can spur a worker to high effort only by rewarding him for high output. If the
worker is risk-averse, the principal may blunt the incentive somewhat, reducing the payoff
slightly when output is high and increasing the payoff when output is low, but maintaining a
difference between them.
This model has been applied to political institutions,28 and indeed is implicit in
Madison’s theory of separation of powers. Madison and the other founders feared an
unconstrained government. Most of the direct power to do harm (as well as good) lay with the
executive, who commands the troops. The executive is the agent; the people are the principal.
The challenge was to design a constitution that gave the executive the power to govern, while
aligning his interests with those of the people.
Simplifying greatly, the original solution combined elections and separation of powers.
The people elect (directly or indirectly) members of Congress who deliberate and determine
policy which is embodied in law. The president—also (indirectly) elected by the people—
merely executes the law determined by Congress. The courts ensure that the president executes
the law in good faith. The people reward the president who faithfully executes the law by
reelecting him, and punishes the president who does not by ejecting him from office. The public
also uses elections to select among candidates the one who seems most likely to take the rule of
law seriously. Electoral mechanisms similarly discipline Congress. The overall picture is one
where the people elect two agents—the president and Congress—and uses one of the agents
(Congress) to help control the other (the president).
27

For a textbook treatment, see Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The PrincipalAgent Model (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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See, e.g., Timothy Besley, Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007).

10

Madison’s theory rested on a key assumption about legislative-executive relations that
Schmitt clearly saw, in a different historical setting, but that has been mostly neglected by
modern scholars. In order to control the president, Congress must enact law in the form of rules,
not standards. Rules can constrain the president by making it clear in advance what he may do
and not do; this makes it easy for Congress, the courts, and the people to determine later whether
the president has complied with or broken the law. Standards cannot constrain the president, or
at least not as well.
Consider a recent example. After 9/11, Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of
Military Force, which enabled the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons.”29 The president was also subject to a number of existing
statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Anti-Torture Statute. The
AUMF created a standard governing the deployment of forces against terrorist threats. Policy
questions such as how much force to use, against whom, and where, were left to the president to
answer. As a result, when the president expanded the war against terror to Pakistan, no one
could argue that the president had broken the law, whatever the merits of this decision as a
matter of policy. By contrast, the wiretapping and interrogation policies adopted by the Bush
administration more clearly violated the relatively specific rules in FISA and the Anti-Torture
Act.
Schmitt believed that constitution-writing assemblies and legislatures cannot enact
substantive laws that govern the executive during emergencies; the most the rulemaker can
specify in advance is who will exercise emergency powers. 30 The argument falls out of the
rules/standards analysis. Emergencies are, by their nature, unique. Every threat to the nation is
different. If emergencies are unique, then their features cannot be predicted on the basis of the
past, which means that legislatures will not be able to use rules to govern the executive’s
behavior during them. The cost of predicting the nature of the next security threat is too high;
and given their busy agendas, legislatures have little motivation to invest the resources in trying
to predict the future. Instead of enacting rules that govern the executive during emergencies,
legislatures enact standards, in effect delegating to the executive the power to take aggressive
actions to defend the nation under ill-defined conditions and subject to ill-defined constraints. In
the United States, most emergency legislation takes the forms of standards; and it exists
alongside a constitutional understanding that the executive has the primary responsibility for
fending off foreign attacks and addressing other threats, and may draw on military and law
enforcement resources to do so.
29
30
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If Congress cannot regulate in advance of emergencies, might it not be able to regulate
once the emergency begins? The problem is that in the early stages of the emergency, the
legislature is hampered by its many-headed structure. Large bodies of people deliberate and act
slowly (unless they act as mobs). The best that the legislature can do is ratify the executive’s
actions by blessing it with a retroactive authorization, or call a halt to the executive’s response by
defunding it. As the emergency matures, the legislature continues to be hampered. Crises unfold
in an unpredictable fashion; secrecy will be at a premium. Public deliberation compromises
secrecy; the unpredictability of the threat eliminates the value of lawmaking. The legislature’s
role in the emergency is marginal. It can grant or withhold political support; and it can legislate
along the margins. The legislature may be able to undermine the executive response by
defunding it, but it will rarely do so because some response is always better than none. The
problem for the legislature is that it cannot make policy in a fine-grained way; its choice—broad
support or none at all—is no choice at all. Anticipating a body of literature in positive political
theory, Schmitt noted that “the extraordinary lawmaker [i.e. the President of the Reich] can
create accomplished facts in opposition to the ordinary legislature. Indeed, especially
consequential measures, for example, armed interventions and executions, can, in fact, no longer
be set aside.” 31 The President’s first-mover role – the “presidential power of unilateral action” 32
– implies that he can create a new status quo that constrains Congress’ subsequent response, both
in practical terms and because the President can use his veto powers to block legislative attempts
to restore the status quo ante.
Courts face similar problems. Detailed statutes enacted before the emergency will seem
antiquated and inapt. Courts will feel pressure to interpret them loosely or use procedural
obstacles to avoid their application. For this reason, violations of FISA and the Anti-Torture Act
never led to prosecutions. Vague statutes enacted before and after the emergency provide no rule
of decision, and courts are reluctant to substitute their views about policy for those of the
executive, which has far more expertise and resources. Commentators have urged courts to use
constitutional norms or even international law to control the executive, but these norms also
prove to be ambiguous standards rather than clear-cut rules. To apply such standards, courts
would have to engage in judicial policymaking. But judges do not believe that they have the
information or expertise to make policy during emergencies and so they have seldom taken this
approach.
The upshot is that the Madisonian theory is a poor description of how modern democratic
governments operate during emergencies and in anticipation of emergencies. Congress cannot
realistically enact rules in advance, and cannot commit to enforce them if violated, so the
policymaking authority during emergencies rests with the executive. Indeed, because the
31
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executive has responsibility for protecting the country during emergencies, only the executive
has motivation to prepare for emergencies, which it does by putting into place institutions and
agencies, and the legal authority that they will rely on. It is the executive that has constructed the
national security state; Congress has mostly ratified the policies adopted by a series of
presidents. Congress retains a very crude veto power; it can interfere executive policymaking
during emergencies only by withdrawing funds and, in effect, calling the emergency off. But
Congress is highly constrained by the nature of the threat, and can use this blunt instrument only
in extreme circumstances. The current system, then, is better described as one of executive
primacy than separation of powers. The president makes and executes policy subject to weak
vetoes by Congress and the courts, which can be exercised only after the president has
committed the country to a response to the perceived threat, and hence have little practical effect.
Although he saw clearly that the conditions of modern politics and the administrative
state tended to generate a plebiscitary executive, 33 Schmitt went astray by arguing that such a
system would eventually result in a Caesarist form of democracy by acclamation. 34 Electoral
institutions remain an effective means to control the executive. Recall that the agency model
requires that the principal observes output (“payoffs”) and reward or punish the agent
accordingly. In the United States, the public observes the output—security or no security—and
holds the executive responsible. Democracy, albeit of a limited sort, continues to work. Schmitt
believed that an executive with the power to declare emergencies and dictate policy during
emergencies, could use the same power to undermine electoral institutions, the press, and other
checks. But that has not happened in the United States; Lincoln, who enjoyed near-dictatorial
powers, submitted to an election in 1864, as did Franklin Roosevelt in 1944. Perhaps it has not
happened because of luck, but for the time being it does seem likely that the public would
repudiate any president who used an emergency as an excuse for attacking democratic
institutions. Indeed, it seems unlikely that his subordinates in the government would cooperate
with him. 35
Lincoln famously asked "are all the laws but one to go unexecuted and the government
itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?" 36 Schmitt took a similar view, arguing that during
an emergency, a “commissarial dictator” must violate existing laws to save the state. 37 This idea
follows from the problem with rules: that they cannot provide adequate guidance for unique
situations. If the legislature nonetheless enacts rules for emergencies, or general rules that lack
exceptions for emergencies, the executive must be willing to violate them in order to save the
33
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nation. However alarming this proposition might seem, it follows from a standard notion in the
law: the rule-interpreter must enforce the purpose behind the rule when enforcement of the literal
terms of the rule itself would have bad consequences. This notion is termed “purposivism” and,
in America, is associated with the “legal process” approach to interpretation. 38 In this sense,
Schmitt can be understood as a legal process or purposivist interpreter, writ very large. 39 What
is different in the emergency case is that the stakes are higher, and the executive rather than the
courts takes primary responsibility for interpreting the rule. But there should be no great mystery
about Schmitt’s argument for executive primacy, which is perfectly straightforward – whether or
not correct – when read in light of the modern distinction between rules and standards.
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